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Abstract
We consider the distributed statistical learning problem over decentralized systems that are
prone to adversarial attacks. This setup arises in many practical applications, including Google’s
Federated Learning. Formally, we focus on a decentralized system that consists of a parameter
server and m working machines; each working machine keeps N/m data samples, where N is the
total number of samples. In each iteration, up to q of the m working machines suffer Byzantine
faults – a faulty machine in the given iteration behaves arbitrarily badly against the system
and has complete knowledge of the system. Additionally, the sets of faulty machines may be
different across iterations. Our goal is to design robust algorithms such that the system can
learn the underlying true parameter, which is of dimension d, despite the interruption of the
Byzantine attacks.
In this paper, based on the geometric median of means of the gradients, we propose a sim-
ple variant of the classical gradient descent method. We show that our method can tolerate
q Byzantine failures up to 2(1 + ǫ)q ≤ m for an arbitrarily small but fixed constant ǫ > 0.
The parameter estimate converges in O(logN) rounds with an estimation error on the order of
max{√dq/N, √d/N}, which is larger than the minimax-optimal error rate √d/N in the cen-
tralized and failure-free setting by at most a factor of
√
q. The total computational complexity
of our algorithm is of O((Nd/m) logN) at each working machine and O(md + kd log3N) at
the central server, and the total communication cost is of O(md logN). We further provide an
application of our general results to the linear regression problem.
A key challenge arises in the above problem is that Byzantine failures create arbitrary and
unspecified dependency among the iterations and the aggregated gradients. To handle this
issue in the analysis, we prove that the aggregated gradient, as a function of model parameter,
converges uniformly to the true gradient function.
1 Introduction
Distributed machine learning has emerged as an attractive solution to large-scale problems and
received intensive attention [BPC+11, JLY16, MNSJ15, PH96, DG08, LBG+12]. In this setting, the
data samples or/and computation are distributed across multiple machines, which are programmed
to collaboratively learn a model. Many efficient distributed machine learning algorithms [BPC+11,
JLY16] and system implementations [MNSJ15, PH96, DG08, LBG+12] have been proposed and
studied. Prior work mostly focuses on the traditional “training within cloud” framework where the
model training process is carried out within the cloud infrastructures. In this framework, distributed
machine learning is secured via system architectures, hardware devices, and monitoring [KPS02,
PP02, WWRL10]. This framework faces significant privacy risk, as the data has to be collected
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from owners and stored within the clouds. Although a variety of privacy-preserving solutions have
been developed [AS00, DWJ13], privacy breaches occur frequently, with recent examples including
iCloud leaks of celebrity photos and PRISM surveillance program.
To address privacy concerns1 , a new machine learning paradigm called Federated Learning was
proposed by Google researchers [KMR15, MR10]. It aims at learning an accurate model without
collecting data from owners and storing the data in the cloud. The training data is kept locally
on the owners’ computing devices, which are recruited to participate directly in the model training
process and hence function as working machines. Google has been intensively testing this new
paradigm in their recent projects such as Gboard [MR10], the Google Keyboard. Compared to
“training within cloud”, Federated Learning faces the following three key challenges:
• Security: The devices of the recruited data owners can be easily reprogrammed and completely
controlled by external attackers, and thus behave adversarially.
• Small local datasets versus high model complexity: While the total number of data samples
over all data owners may be large, each individual owner may keep only a small amount of
data, which by itself is insufficient for learning a complex model.
• Communication constraints: Data transmission between the recruited devices and the cloud
may suffer from high latency and low-throughout. Communication between them is therefore
a scarce resource.
In this paper, we address the above challenges by developing a simple variant of the gradient
descent method that can (1) tolerate the arbitrary and adversarial failures, (2) accurately learn
a highly complex model with low local data volume, and (3) converge exponentially fast using
logarithmic communication rounds. Since gradient descent algorithms are well-adopted in existing
implementations and applications, our proposed method only requires a small amount of modifica-
tion of existing codes.
Note that there are many other challenges besides what are listed here, including unevenly
distributed training data, intermittent availability of mobile phones, etc. These challenges will be
addressed in future work.
1.1 Learning Goals
To formally study the distributed machine learning problem in adversarial settings, we consider a
standard statistical learning setup, where the data is generated probabilistically from an unknown
distribution and the true model is parameterized by a vector. More specifically, let X ∈ X be
the input data generated according to some unknown distribution µ. Let Θ ⊂ Rd be the set
of all choices of model parameters. We consider a loss function f : X × Θ → R, where f(x, θ)
measures the risk induced by a realization x of the data under the model parameter choice θ. A
classical example is linear regression, where x = (w, y) ∈ Rd × R is the feature-response pair and
f(x, θ) = 12 (〈w, θ〉 − y)2 is the usual squared loss.
We are interested in learning the model choice θ∗ that minimizes the population risk, i.e.,
θ∗ ∈ argmin
θ∈Θ
F (θ) , E [f(X, θ)] , (1)
1We would like to characterize the amount of privacy sacrificed in the Federated Learning paradigm. We leave
this characterization as one of our future work.
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assuming that E [f(X, θ)] is well defined over Θ.2 The model choice θ∗ is optimal in the sense that
it minimizes the average risk to pay if the model chosen is used for prediction in the future with a
fresh random data sample.
When µ—the distribution of X—is known, which is rarely the case in practice, the population
risk can be evaluated exactly, and θ∗ can be computed by solving the minimization problem in (1).
We focus on the more realistic scenario where µ is unknown but there exist N independently and
identically distributed data samples Xi
i.i.d.∼ µ for i = 1, . . . , N . Note that estimating θ∗ using finitely
many data samples will always have a statistical error due to the randomness in the data, even in
the centralized, failure-free setting. Our results account for this effect.
1.2 System Model
We focus on solving the above statistical learning problem over decentralized systems that are
prone to adversarial attacks. Specifically, the system of interest consists of a parameter server3 and
m working machines. In the example of Federated Learning, the parameter server represents the
cloud, and the m working machines correspond to m data owners’ computing devices.
We assume that the N data samples are distributed evenly across the m working machines.
In particular, each working machine i keeps a subset Si of the data, where Si ∩ Sj = ∅ and
|Si| = N/m. Note that this is a simplifying assumption of the data imbalance in Federated Learning.
Nevertheless, our results can be extended to the heterogeneous data sizes setting when the data
sizes are of the same order. We further assume that the parameter server can communicate with
all working machines in synchronous communication rounds, and leave the asynchronous setting as
future directions.
Among the m working machines, we assume that up to q of them can suffer Byzantine failures
and thus behave maliciously; for example, they may be reprogrammed and completely controlled by
the system attacker. We assume the parameter server knows q – as q can be estimated from the ex-
isting system failures statistics. The set of Byzantine machines can change between communication
rounds; the system attacker can choose different sets of machines to control across communication
rounds. Byzantine faulty machines are assumed to have complete knowledge of the system, including
the total number of working machines m, all N data samples over the whole system, the programs
that the working machines are supposed to run, the program run by the parameter server, and the
realization of the random bits generated by the parameter server. Moreover, Byzantine machines
can collude [Lyn96]. The only constraint is that these machines cannot corrupt the local data
on working machines — but they can lie when communicating with the server. In fact, our main
results show that our proposed algorithm still works when at most q different machines with local
data corrupted during its execution.
We remark that Byzantine failures are used to capture the unpredictability of extremely large
system that consists of heterogeneous processes, as is the case with Federated Learning. The
arbitrary behavior of Byzantine machines creates unspecified dependency across communication
rounds — a key challenge in our algorithm design and convergence analysis. In this paper, we use
rounds and iterations interchangeably.
2For example, if E [|f(X, θ)|] is finite for every θ ∈ Θ, the population risk E [f(X, θ)] is well defined.
3Note that, due to communication bandwidth constraints, practical systems use multiple networked parameter
servers. In this paper, for ease of explanation, we assume there is only one parameter server. Fortunately, as can be
seen from our algorithm descriptions and our detailed correctness analysis, the proposed algorithm also works for the
multi-server setting.
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1.3 Existing Distributed Machine Learning Algorithms
There are three popular classes of existing distributed machine learning algorithms in terms of their
communication rounds.
SGD: On one end of the spectrum lies the Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) algorithm. Using
this algorithm, the parameter server receives, in each iteration, a gradient computed at a single
data sample from one working machine, and uses it to perform one gradient descent step. Even
when the population risk F is strongly convex, the convergence rate of SGD is only O(1/t) with t
iterations. This is much slower than the exponential (geometric) convergence of standard gradient
descent. Therefore, SGD requires a large number of communication rounds, which could be costly.
Indeed, it has been demonstrated in [MR10] that SGD has 10-100 times higher communication cost
than standard gradient descent, and is therefore inadequate for scenarios with scarce communica-
tion bandwidth.
One-Shot Aggregation: On the other end of the spectrum, using a One-Shot Aggregation
method, each working machine computes an estimate of the model parameter using only its local
data and reports it to the server, which then aggregates all the estimates reported to obtain a final
estimate [ZDW13, ZDW15]. One-shot aggregation method only needs a single round of commu-
nication from the working machines to the parameter server, and thus is communication-efficient.
However, it requires N/m ≫ d so that a coarse parameter estimate can be obtained at each ma-
chine. This algorithm is therefore not applicable in scenarios where local data is small in size but
the model to learn is of high dimension.
BGD: Batch Gradient Descent (BGD) lies in between the above two extremes. At each iteration,
the parameter server sends the current model parameter estimate to all working machines. Each
working machine computes the gradient based on all locally available data, and then sends the
gradient back to the parameter server. The parameter server averages the received gradients and
performs a gradient descent step. When the population risk F is strongly convex, BGD converges
exponentially fast, and hence requires only a few rounds of communication. BGD also works in
the scenarios with limited local data, i.e., N/m = O(d), making it an ideal candidate in Federated
Learning. However, it is sensitive to Byzantine failures; a single Byzantine failure at a working
machine can completely skew the average value of the gradients received by the parameter server,
and thus foils the algorithm.
1.4 Contributions
In this paper, we propose a Byzantine gradient descent method. Specifically, the parameter server
aggregates the local gradients reported by the working machines in three steps: (1) it partitions all
the received local gradients into k batches and computes the mean for each batch, (2) it computes
the geometric median of the k batch means, and (3) it performs a gradient descent step using the
geometric median.
We prove that the proposed algorithm can tolerate q Byzantine failures up to 2(1+ ǫ)q ≤ m for
an arbitrarily small but fixed constant ǫ > 0. Moreover, the error in estimating the target model
parameter θ∗ converges in log(N) communication rounds to the order of max{√dq/N, √d/N},
whereas the minimax-optimal estimation error rate in the centralized and failure-free setting is√
d/N .4 Even in the scarce local data regime where N/m = O(d), the estimator of our proposed
4Note that
√
d/N is the minimax optimal estimation error rate even in the centralized, failure-free setting when
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algorithm is still consistent as long as N/q = ω(d). The total computational complexity of our
algorithm is of O((N/m)d logN) at each worker and O(md + qd log3N) at the parameter server,
and the total communication cost is of O(md logN). Note that the
√
q factor in our estimation
error rate max{√dq/N, √d/N} may not be fundamental to the problem of learning in adversarial
settings. Thus, it may possibly be improved with better algorithms or finer analysis.
A key challenge in our analysis is that there exists complicated probabilistic dependency among
the iterates and the aggregated gradients. Even worse, such dependency cannot be specified due to
the arbitrary behavior of the Byzantine machines. We overcome this challenge by proving that the
geometric median of means of gradients uniformly converges to the true gradient function ∇F (·).
1.5 Outline
The origination of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present our algorithm, named Byzantine
Gradient Descent Method, and summarize our convergence results. Detailed convergence analysis
can be found in Section 3. To illustrate the applicability of our convergence results, we provide a
linear regression example in Section 4. Related work is discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes
the paper, and presents several interesting future directions.
2 Algorithms and Summary of Convergence Results
In this section, we present our distributed statistical machine learning algorithm, named Byzantine
Gradient Descent Method, and briefly summarize our convergence results on its performance.
2.1 Byzantine Gradient Descent Method
Recall that our fundamental goal is to learn the optimal model choice θ∗ defined in (1). We
make the following standard assumption [BPC+11] so that the minimization problem in (1) can
be solved efficiently (exponentially fast) in the ideal case when the population risk function F is
known exactly, i.e., the distribution µ is known.
Assumption 1. The population risk function F : Θ → R is L-strongly convex, and differentiable
over Θ with M -Lipschitz gradient. That is, for all θ, θ′ ∈ Θ,
F (θ′) ≥ F (θ) + 〈∇F (θ), θ′ − θ〉+ L
2
‖θ′ − θ‖2,
and
‖∇F (θ)−∇F (θ′)‖ ≤M‖θ − θ′‖.
Under Assumption 1, it is well-known [BV04] that using the standard gradient descent update
θt = θt−1 − η ×∇F (θt−1), (2)
where η is some fixed stepsize, θt approaches θ
∗ exponentially fast. In particular, choosing η =
L/(2M2), it holds that
‖θt − θ∗‖ ≤
(
1−
(
L
2M
)2)t/2
‖θ0 − θ∗‖.
we would like to estimate a d-dimensional unknown parameter without any additional structure from N i.i.d. samples,
see e.g., [Wu17, Section 3.2] for a proof in the special case of Gaussian mean estimation. When there is additional
structure, say sparsity, then the
√
d factor can possibly be improved.
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Nevertheless, when the distribution µ is unknown, as assumed in this paper, the population gradient
∇F can only be approximated using sample gradients, if they exist.
Recall that each working machine j (can possibly be Byzantine) keeps a very small set of data
Sj with |Sj | = N/m. Define the local empirical risk function, denoted by f¯ (j) : Θ→ R, as follows:
f¯ (j)(θ) ,
1
|Sj |
∑
i∈Sj
f(Xi, θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ. (3)
Notice that f¯ (j)(·) is a function of data samples Sj stored at machine j. Hence f¯ (j)(·) is random.
Although Byzantine machines can send arbitrarily malicious messages to the parameter server, they
are unable to corrupt the local stored data. Thus, the local risk function f¯ (j)(·) is well-defined for
all j, including the Byzantine machines. With a bit of abuse of notation, we let
f¯(θ) ,
(
f¯ (1)(θ), . . . , f¯ (m)(θ)
)
be the vector that stacks the values of the m local functions evaluated at θ. For any x ∈ X , we
assume that f(x, .) : Θ→ R is differentiable. When there is no confusion, we write ∇θf(x, θ) – the
gradient of function f(x, ·) evaluated at θ – simply as ∇f(x, θ).
It is well-known that the average of the local gradients can be viewed as an approximation of
the population gradient ∇F (·). In particular, for a fixed θ, as N →∞
1
m
m∑
j=1
∇f¯ (j)(θ) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
∇f(Xi, θ) a.s.−−→ ∇F (θ). (4)
Batch Gradient Descent relies on this observation. However, this method is sensitive to Byzantine
failures as we explain next.
Batch Gradient Descent We describe the Batch Gradient Descent (BGD) in Algorithm 1. We
initialize θ0 to be some arbitrary value in Θ for simplicity. In practice, there are standard guides
in choosing the initial point [SB98]. In round t ≥ 1, the parameter server sends the current model
parameter estimator θt−1 to all working machines. Each working machine j computes the gradient
∇f¯ (j)(θt−1) and sends ∇f¯ (j)(θt−1) back to the parameter server. Note that Byzantine machines
may not follow the codes in Algorithm 1. Instead of the true local gradients, Byzantine machines
can report arbitrarily malicious messages or no message to the server. If the server does not receive
any message from a working machine, then that machine must be Byzantine faulty. In that case, the
server sets g
(j)
t (θt−1) to some arbitrary value. Precisely, let Bt denote the set of Byzantine machines
at round t in a given execution. The message received from machine j, denoted by g
(j)
t (θt−1), can
be described as
g
(j)
t (θt−1) =
{
∇f¯ (j)(θt−1) if j /∈ Bt
⋆ o.w. ,
(5)
where, with a bit of abuse of notation, ⋆ denotes the arbitrary message whose value may be different
across Byzantine machines, iterations, executions, etc. In step 3, the parameter server averages the
received g
(j)
t (θt−1) and updates θt using a gradient descent step.
Under Assumption 1, when there are no Byzantine machines, it is well-known that BGD con-
verges exponentially fast. However, a single Byzantine failure can completely skew the average
value of the gradients received by the parameter server, and thus foils the algorithm. It is still
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Algorithm 1 Standard Gradient Descent: Iteration t ≥ 1
Parameter server:
1: Initialize: Let θ0 be an arbitrary point in Θ.
2: Broadcast the current model parameter estimator θt−1 to all working machines;
3: Wait to receive all the gradients reported by the m machines; Let g
(j)
t (θt−1) denote the value
received from machine j.
If no message from machine j is received, set g
(j)
t (θt−1) to be some arbitrary value;
4: Update: θt ← θt−1 − η ×
(
1
m
∑m
j=1 g
(j)
t (θt−1)
)
;
Working machine j:
1: Compute the gradient ∇f¯ (j)(θt−1);
2: Send ∇f¯ (j)(θt−1) back to the parameter server;
the case even if the parameter server takes an average of a randomly selected subset of received
gradients. This is because a Byzantine machine is assumed to have complete knowledge of the
system, including the gradients reported by other machines, and the realization of the random bits
generated by the parameter server.
Robust Gradient Aggregation Instead of taking the average of the received gradients
g
(1)
t (θt−1), · · · , g(m)t (θt−1),
we propose a robust way to aggregate the collected gradients. Our aggregation rule is based on the
notion of geometric median.
Geometric median is a generalization of median in one-dimension to multiple dimensions, and
has been widely used in robust statistics [MNO+10, MD+87, Kem87, CCZ+13]. Let {y1, . . . , yn} ⊆
R
d be a multi-set of size n. The geometric median of {y1, . . . , yn}, denoted by med{y1, . . . , yn}, is
defined as
med{y1, . . . , yn} , argmin
y∈Rd
n∑
i=1
‖y − yi‖. (6)
Geometric median is NOT required to lie in {y1, . . . , yn}, and is unique unless all the points in
{y1, . . . , yn} lie on a line. Note that if the ℓ2 norm in (6) is replaced by the squared ℓ2 norm, i.e.,
‖ · ‖2, then the minimizer is exactly the average.
In one dimension, median has the following nice robustness property: if strictly more than
⌊n/2⌋ points are in [−r, r] for some r ∈ R, then the median must be in [−r, r]. Likewise, in multiple
dimensions, geometric median has similar robust property [M+15, Lemma 2.1] [CLM+16, Lemma
24]. The following lemma shows that a (1 + γ)- approximate geometric median is also robust. Its
proof is a simple adaptation of the proof of Lemma 24 in [CLM+16] and presented in Appendix A.
Lemma 1. Let z1, . . . , zn denote n points in a Hilbert space. Let z∗ denote a (1+γ)-approximation
of their geometric median, i.e.,
∑n
i=1 ‖z∗ − zi‖ ≤ (1 + γ)minz
∑n
i=1 ‖z − zi‖ for γ > 0. For any
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α ∈ (0, 1/2) and given r ∈ R, if ∑ni=1 1{‖zi‖≤r} ≥ (1− α)n, then
‖z∗‖ ≤ Cαr + γminz
∑n
i=1 ‖z − zi‖
(1− 2α)n ≤ Cαr + γ
max1≤i≤n ‖zi‖
1− 2α ,
where
Cα =
2(1− α)
1− 2α . (7)
The above lemma shows that as long as there are sufficiently many points (majority in terms
of fraction) inside the Euclidean ball of radius r centered at origin, then the geometric median
(γ = 0) must lie in the Euclidean ball blowed up by a constant factor only. Intuitively, geometric
median can be viewed as an aggregated center of a set based on majority vote. Note that the exact
geometric median may not be computed efficiently in practice. The above lemma further shows
that (1+ γ)-approximate geometric median also lies in the Euclidean ball blowed up by a constant
factor plus a deviation term proportional to γ and maxi ‖zi‖.
Let gt(θt−1) =
(
g
(1)
t (θt−1), . . . , g
(m)
t (θt−1)
)
be the vector that stacks the gradients received by
the parameter server at iteration t. Let k be an integer which divides m and let b = m/k denote
the batch size. In our proposed robust gradient aggregation, the parameter server (1) first divides
m working machines into k batches, (2) then takes the average of local gradients in each batch,
and (3) finally takes the geometric median of those k batch means. With the aggregated gradient,
the parameter server performs a gradient descent update. Notice that when the number of batches
Algorithm 2 Byzantine Gradient Descent: Iteration t ≥ 1
Parameter server:
1: Initialize: Let θ0 be an arbitrary point in Θ; group the m machines into k batches, with the
ℓ-th batch being {(ℓ− 1)b+ 1, . . . , ℓb} for 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k.
2: Broadcast the current model parameter estimator θt−1 to all working machines;
3: Wait to receive all the gradients reported by the m machines; If no message from machine j is
received, set ∇g˜j(θt−1) to be some arbitrary value;
4: Robust Gradient Aggregation
Ak(gt(θt−1))← med
1b
b∑
j=1
g
(j)
t (θt−1), · · · ,
1
b
n∑
j=n−b+1
g
(j)
t (θt−1)
 . (8)
5: Update: θt ← θt−1 − η ×Ak
(
gt(θt−1)
)
;
Working machine j:
1: Compute the gradient ∇f¯ (j)(θt−1);
2: Send ∇f¯ (j)(θt−1) back to the parameter server;
k = 1, the geometric median of means reduces to the average, i.e.,
A1{gt(θt−1)} = 1
m
m∑
j=1
g
(j)
t (θt−1).
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When k = m, the median of means reduces to the geometric median
Am{gt(θt−1)} = med{g(1)t (θt−1), . . . , g(m)t (θt−1)}.
Hence, the geometric median of means can be viewed as an interpolation between the mean and
the geometric median. Since the parameter server knows q – the upper bound on the number
of Byzantine machines q, it can choose k accordingly. We will discuss the choice of k after the
statement of our main theorem.
2.2 Summary of Convergence Results
For ease of presentation, we present an informal statement of our main theorem. The precise
statement and its proof are given in Section 3.3. Our convergence results hold under some technical
assumptions on the sample gradients ∇f(Xi, ·), formally stated in Section 3.3. Roughly speaking,
such assumptions mimic Assumption 1 (placed on population risk F ), and can be viewed a stochastic
version of strong convexity and Lipschitz-continuity conditions.
Theorem 1 (Informal). Suppose some mild technical assumptions hold and 2(1 + ǫ)q ≤ k ≤
m for any arbitrary but fixed constant ǫ > 0. Fix any fixed constant α ∈ ( 12+2ǫ , 12) and any
δ > 0 such that δ ≤ α − q/k. There exist universal constants c1, c2 > 0 such that if N/k ≥
c1C
2
α (d log(N/k) + log(1/δ)), then with probability at least
1− exp (−kD ((α − q/k)‖δ)) ,
the iterates {θt} given by Algorithm 2 with η = L/(2M2) satisfy
‖θt − θ∗‖ ≤
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
1− L
2
4M2
)t
‖θ0 − θ∗‖+ c2Cα
√
k (d+ log(1/δ))
N
, (9)
for t ≥ 1, where D(δ′‖δ) = δ′ log δ′δ + (1− δ′) log 1−δ
′
1−δ denotes the binary divergence.
The characterization of c1 and c2 can be found in Section 3.3. In Theorem 1, in addition to the
non-specified “technical assumptions”, we also impose assumptions on δ, α, N/k and d. Next we
illustrate that these conditions can indeed hold simultaneously.
As can be seen later, δ can be viewed as the expected fraction of batches that are “statistically
bad”; the larger the batch sample size N/k (comparing to d), the smaller δ. Additionally, up to q/k
fraction of the batches may contain Byzantine machines. In total, we may expect δ+q/k fraction of
the batches to be bad. Theorem 1 says that as long as the total fraction of bad batches is less than
1/2, we are able to show with high probability, our Byzantine Gradient Descent Method converges
exponentially fast.
Remark 1. In this remark, we discuss the choice of k.
When q = 0, k can be chosen to be 1 and log(1/δ) can be chosen to be d. Thus the geometric
median of means reduces to simple averaging. Theorem 1 implies that with probability at least
1− e−Ω(d), the asymptotic estimation error rate is √d/N .
For q ≥ 1, we can choose k to be 2(1 + ǫ)q for an arbitrarily small but fixed constant ǫ > 0 and
α = 2+ǫ4+4ǫ and log(1/δ) = d. In this way, α−q/k = ǫ4+4ǫ . Using the property thatD(δ′‖δ) ≥ δ′ log δ
′
eδ ,
we have that D ((α− q/k)‖δ) ≥ Ω(d). Hence as long as N/k ≥ c1d log(N/k) for a sufficiently large
universal constant c1, with probability at least 1 − e−Ω(qd), the estimation error of θt converges
exponentially fast to c2
√
dq/N for a universal constant c2.
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Based on our analysis, the number of batches k in our Byzantine gradient algorithm provides a
trade-off between the statistical estimation error and the Byzantine failures: With a larger k, our
algorithm can tolerate more Byzantine failures, but the estimation error gets larger. However, this
trade-off may be an artifact of our proof and may not be fundamental.
Remark 2. In this remark, we discuss the practical issues of computing geometric median.
Since exact geometric median may not be computed efficiently in practice, we can use (1 + γ)-
approximate geometric median in the robust gradient aggregation step (8). Moreover, in view
of Lemma 1, comparing to the exact geometric median, a (1 + γ)-approximate geometric median
induces an additional deviation term proportional to γ and the maximum norm of the averaged
batch gradients. Therefore, in (8), we also trim away averaged batch gradients of norm larger than
a threshold τ before computing the (1+ γ)-approximate geometric median. Since the gradients are
of dimension d, one can choose the threshold τ = Θ(d) so that with high probability the averaged
gradients over Byzantine-free batches will not be trimmed away. Finally by choosing γ = 1/N , the
additional deviation term is ensured to be O(d/N) and thus it will not affect the final estimation
error which is on the order of max{√dq/N, √d/N}.
Our algorithm is both computation and communication efficient. Under the choice of k in
Remark 1, the computation and communication cost of our proposed algorithm can be summarized
as follows. For estimation error converging to c2
√
dq/N , O(logN) communication rounds are
sufficient. In each round, every working machine transmits a d-dimensional vector to the parameter
server. In terms of computation cost, in each round, every working machine computes a gradient
based on N/m local data samples, which takes O(Nd/m). The parameter server computes the
geometric median of means of gradients. The means of gradients over all batches can be computed
in O(md) steps. It is shown in [CLM+16] that a (1 + γ)-approximate geometric median can be
computed in O(qd log3(1/γ)) and as we discussed in Remark 2, γ = 1/N suffices for our purpose.
Therefore, in each round, in total the parameter server needs to take O(md+ qd log3(N)) steps.
3 Convergence Results and Analysis
In this section, we present our main results and their proofs.
Recall that in Algorithm 2, the machines are grouped into k batches beforehand. For each batch
of machines 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, we define a function Zℓ : Θ → Rd to be the difference between the average
of the batch sample gradient functions and the population gradient, i.e., ∀ θ ∈ Θ
Zℓ(θ) ,
1
b
ℓb∑
j=(ℓ−1)b+1
∇f¯ (j)(θ)−∇F (θ)
=
k
N
ℓb∑
j=(ℓ−1)b+1
∑
i∈Sj
∇f(Xi, θ)−∇F (θ), (10)
where the last equality follows from (3) and the fact that batch size b = m/k and local data size
|Sj | = N/m. Since each function Zℓ depends on the local data at ℓ-batch {Xi : i ∈ Sj , (ℓ−1)b+1 ≤
j ≤ ℓb} and Xi’s are i.i.d., the functions Zℓ(·)’s are also “independently and identically distributed”.
For any given positive precision parameters ξ1 and ξ2 specified later, and α ∈ (0, 1/2), define a good
event
Eα,ξ1,ξ2 ,
{
k∑
ℓ=1
1{∀θ: Cα‖Zℓ(θ)‖≤ξ2‖θ−θ∗‖+ξ1} ≥ k(1− α) + q
}
. (11)
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Informally speaking, on event Eα,ξ1,ξ2 , in at least k(1 − α) + q batches, the average of the batch
sample gradient functions is uniformly close to the population gradient function.
We show our convergence results of Algorithm 2 in two steps. The first step is “deterministic”,
showing that our Byzantine gradient descent algorithm converges exponentially fast on good event
Eα,ξ1,ξ2 . The second part is “stochastic”, proving that this good event Eα,ξ1,ξ2 happens with high
probability.
3.1 Convergence of Byzantine Gradient Descent on Eα,ξ1,ξ2
We consider a fixed execution. Recall that Bt denotes the set of Byzantine machines at iteration t
of the given execution, which could change across iterations. Define a vector of functions gt(·) with
respect to Bt as:
gt(θ) = (g
(1)
t (θ), . . . , g
(m)
t (θ)), ∀ θ
such that ∀ θ,
g
(j)
t (θ) =
{
∇f¯ (j)(θ) if j /∈ Bt
⋆ o.w. ,
where ⋆ is arbitrary5. That is, g
(j)
t (·) is the true gradient function f¯ (j)(·) if machine j is not
Byzantine at iteration t, and arbitrary otherwise. It is easy to see that the definition of gt(·) is
consistent with the definition of gt(θt−1) in (5). Define Z˜ℓ(·) for each θ as
Z˜ℓ(θ) ,
1
b
ℓb∑
j=(ℓ−1)b+1
g
(j)
t (θ)−∇F (θ). (12)
By definition of g
(j)
t (·), for any ℓ-th batch such that
{b(ℓ− 1) + 1, . . . , bℓ} ∩ Bt = ∅,
i.e., it does not contain any Byzantine machine at iteration t, it holds that Z˜ℓ(θ) = Zℓ(θ) for all θ,
where Zℓ(·) is defined in (10).
Lemma 2. On event Eα,ξ1,ξ2, for every iteration t ≥ 1, we have
‖Ak (gt(θ))−∇F (θ)‖ ≤ ξ2‖θ − θ∗‖+ ξ1, ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. By definition of Ak in (8), for any fixed θ,
Ak(gt(θ)) = med
1b
b∑
j=1
g
(j)
t (θ), · · · ,
1
b
m∑
j=m−b+1
g
(j)
t (θ)

Since geometric median is invariant with translation, it follows that
Ak(gt(θ))−∇F (θ) = med
{
Z˜1(θ), · · · , Z˜m(θ)
}
.
On event Eα,ξ1,ξ2 , at least k(1 − α) + q of the k batches {Zℓ : 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k} satisfy Cα‖Zℓ(θ)‖ ≤
ξ2‖θ− θ∗‖+ ξ1 uniformly. Moreover, for Byzantine-free batch ℓ, it holds that Z˜ℓ(·) = Zℓ(·). Hence,
at least k(1 − α) of the k received batches {Z˜ℓ : 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k} satisfy Cα‖Z˜ℓ(θ)‖ ≤ ξ2‖θ − θ∗‖ + ξ1
uniformly. The conclusion readily follows from Lemma 1 with γ = 0.
5By “arbitrary” we mean that g
(j)
t (·) cannot be specified.
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3.1.1 Convergence of Approximate Gradient Descent
Next, we show a convergence result of an approximate gradient descent, which might be of inde-
pendent interest. For any θ ∈ Θ, define a new θ′ as
θ′ = θ − η ×∇F (θ). (13)
We remark that the above update is one step of population gradient descent given in (2).
Lemma 3. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. If we choose the step size η = L/(2M2), then θ′ defined
in (13) satisfies that
‖θ′ − θ∗‖ ≤
√
1− L2/(4M2) ‖θ − θ∗‖. (14)
The proof of Lemma 3 is rather standard, and is presented in Section B for completeness.
Suppose that for each t ≥ 1, we have access to gradient function Gt(·), which satisfy the uniform
deviation bound:
‖Gt(θ)−∇F (θ)‖ ≤ ξ1 + ξ2‖θ − θ∗‖, ∀θ, (15)
for two positive precision parameters ξ1, ξ2 that are independent of t. Then we perform the following
approximate gradient descent as a surrogate for population gradient descent:
θt = θt−1 − η ×Gt(θt−1). (16)
The following lemma establishes the convergence of the approximate gradient descent.
Lemma 4. Suppose Assumption 1 holds, and choose η = L/(2M2). If (15) holds for each t ≥ 1
and
ρ , 1−
√
1− L2/(4M2)− ξ2L/(2M2) > 0,
then the iterates {θt} in (16) satisfy
‖θt − θ∗‖ ≤ (1− ρ)t ‖θ0 − θ∗‖+ ηξ1/ρ.
Remark 3. As it can be seen later, the precision parameter ξ2 can be chosen to be a function of
N/k such that ξ2 → 0 as N/k →∞. Thus, there exists ξ2 for ρ defined in Lemma 4 to be positive.
Proof of Lemma 4. Fix any t ≥ 1, we have
‖θt − θ∗‖ = ‖θt−1 − ηGt(θt−1)− θ∗‖
= ‖θt−1 − η∇F (θt−1)− θ∗ + η (∇F (θt−1)−Gt(θt−1))‖
≤‖θt−1 − η∇F (θt−1)− θ∗‖+ η ‖∇F (θt−1)−Gt(θt−1)‖ .
It follows from Lemma 3 that
‖θt−1 − η∇F (θt−1)− θ∗‖ ≤
√
1− L2/(4M2) ‖θt−1 − θ∗‖
and from (15) that
‖∇F (θt−1)−Gt(θt−1)‖ ≤ ξ1 + ξ2‖θt−1 − θ∗‖.
Hence,
‖θt − θ∗‖ ≤
(√
1− L2/(4M2) + ηξ2
)
‖θt−1 − θ∗‖2 + ηξ1.
A standard telescoping argument then yields that
‖θt − θ∗‖ ≤ (1− ρ)t ‖θ0 − θ∗‖+ ηξ1
t−1∑
τ=0
(1− ρ)τ
≤ (1− ρ)t ‖θ0 − θ∗‖+ ηξ1/ρ,
where ρ = 1−√1− L2/(4M2)− ξ2L/(2M2) and η = L/(2M2).
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3.1.2 Convergence of Byzantine Gradient Descent on Good Event Eα,ξ1,ξ2
With Lemma 2 and the convergence of the approximate gradient descent (Lemma 4), we show that
Algorithm 2 converges exponentially fast on good event Eα,ξ1,ξ2 .
Theorem 2. Suppose event Eα,ξ1,ξ2 holds and iterates {θt} are given by Algorithm 2 with η =
L/(2M2). If ρ = 1−√1− L2/(4M2)− ξ2L/(2M2) > 0 as defined in Lemma 4, then
‖θt − θ∗‖ ≤ (1− ρ)t‖θ0 − θ∗‖+ ηξ1/ρ. (17)
Proof. In Algorithm 2, at iteration t, the parameter server updates the model parameter θt−1 using
the approximate gradient Ak (gt(θt−1)) – the value of the approximate gradient function Ak (gt(·))
evaluated at θt−1. From Lemma 2, we know that on event Eα,ξ1,ξ2
‖Ak (gt(θ))−∇F (θ)‖ ≤ ξ2‖θ − θ∗‖+ ξ1, ∀θ ∈ Θ.
The conclusion then follows from Lemma 4 by setting Gt(θ) to be Ak (gt(θ)).
3.2 Bound Probability of Good Event Eα,ξ1,ξ2
Recall that for each batch ℓ for 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, Zℓ is defined in (10) w.r.t. the data samples collectively
kept by the machines in this batch. Thus, function Zℓ is random. The following lemma gives a
lower bound to the probability of good event Eα,ξ1,ξ2 .
Lemma 5. Suppose for all 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, Zℓ satisfies
P {∀θ : Cα‖Zℓ(θ)‖ ≤ ξ2‖θ − θ∗‖+ ξ1} ≥ 1− δ (18)
for any α ∈ (q/k, 1/2) and 0 < δ ≤ α− q/k. Then
P {Eα,ξ1,ξ2} ≥ 1− e−kD(α−q/k‖δ). (19)
Proof. Let T ∼ Binom(k, 1 − δ). By assumption (18),
k∑
ℓ=1
1{∀θ:Cα‖Zℓ(θ)‖2≤ξ2‖θ−θ∗‖+ξ1}
first-order stochastically dominates T , i.e.,
P
{
k∑
ℓ=1
1{∀θ:Cα‖Zℓ(θ)‖2≤ξ2‖θ−θ∗‖+ξ1} ≥ k(1− α) + q
}
≥ P {T ≥ k(1− α) + q} . (20)
By Chernoff’s bound for binomial distributions, the following holds:
P {T ≥ k(1− α) + q} ≥ 1− e−kD(α−q/k‖δ). (21)
Combining (20) and (21) together, we conclude (19).
It remains to show the uniform convergence of Zℓ as required by (18). To this end, we need
to impose a few technical assumptions that are rather standard [Ver10]. Recall that gradient
∇f(X, θ) is random as the input X is random. We assume gradient ∇f(X, θ∗) is sub-exponential.
The definition and some related concentration properties of sub-exponential random variables are
presented in Section C for completeness.
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Assumption 2. There exist positive constants σ1 and α1 such that for any unit vector v ∈ B,
〈∇f(X, θ∗), v〉 is sub-exponential with scaling parameters σ1 and α1, i.e.,
sup
v∈B
E [exp (λ〈∇f(X, θ∗), v〉)] ≤ eσ21λ2/2, ∀|λ| ≤ 1
α1
,
where B denotes the unit sphere {θ : ‖θ‖2 = 1}.
Intuitively speaking, Assumption 2 is placed to ensure that, with high probability, using the
true sample gradient for individual batches, we are able to “identify” the optimal model θ∗. That
is, (1/n)
∑n
i=1∇f(Xi, θ∗) concentrates around its mean ∇F (θ∗) = 0.
Lemma 6. Suppose Assumption 2 holds. For any δ ∈ (0, 1) and any positive integer n, let
∆1(n, d, δ, σ1) =
√
2σ1
√
d log 6 + log(3/δ)
n
. (22)
If ∆1(n, d, δ, σ1) ≤ σ21/α1, then
P
{∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
∇f(Xi, θ∗)−∇F (θ∗)
∥∥∥∥∥ ≥ 2∆1(n, d, δ, σ1)
}
≤ δ
3
.
Remark 4. By definition of ∆1(n, d, δ, σ1), ∆1(n, d, δ, σ1) is a non-increasing function of n. In
particular, for fixed δ and σ1, if d = o(n),
∆1(n, d, δ, σ1) =
√
2σ1
√
d log 6 + log(3/δ)
n
→ 0 as n→∞.
Thus, if in addition α1 is assumed to be fixed, then for sufficiently large n, ∆1(n, d, δ, σ1) ≤ σ21/α1
holds.
With a little abuse of notation, we write ∆1(n, d, δ, σ1) as ∆1 or ∆1(n) for short when its meaning
is clear from the context. Also, we let ∇f¯n(θ) denote 1n
∑n
i=1∇f(Xi, θ) for ease of exposition.
Proof of Lemma 6. Let V = {v1, . . . , vN1/2} denote an 12 -cover of unit sphere B. It is shown in
[Ver10, Lemma 5.2, Lemma 5.3] that logN1/2 ≤ d log 6, and∥∥∇f¯n(θ∗)−∇F (θ∗)∥∥ ≤ 2 sup
v∈V
{〈∇f¯n(θ∗)−∇F (θ∗), v〉} .
Note that since ∇F (θ∗) = 0, it holds that ∇f(Xi, θ∗) − ∇F (θ∗) = ∇f(Xi, θ∗). By Assumption 2
and the condition that ∆1 ≤ σ21/α1, it follows from concentration inequalities for sub-exponential
random variables given in Theorem 6 that, for v ∈ V
P
{〈∇f¯n(θ∗)−∇F (θ∗), v〉 ≥ ∆1} ≤ exp (−n∆21/(2σ21)) .
Recall that in V contains at most 6d vectors. In view of the union bound, it further yields that
P
{
2 sup
v∈V
{〈∇f¯n(θ∗)−∇F (θ∗), v〉} ≥ 2∆1} ≤ 6d exp (−n∆21/(2σ21))
= exp
(−n∆21/(2σ21) + d log 6) .
Therefore,
P
{∥∥∇f¯n(θ∗)−∇F (θ∗)∥∥ ≥ 2∆1} ≤ exp (−n∆21/(2σ21) + d log 6) .
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In addition to the “identifiability” of the optimal θ∗ using sample gradients ∇f(X, θ∗), similar
to the smoothness requirements of the population gradient ∇F (·) stated in Assumption 1, some
smoothness properties (in stochastic sense) of the sample gradients ∇f(X, ·) are also desired. Next,
we define gradient difference
h(x, θ) , ∇f(x, θ)−∇f(x, θ∗), (23)
which characterizes the deviation of random gradient ∇f(x, θ) from ∇f(x, θ∗). Note that
E [h(X, θ)] = ∇F (θ)−∇F (θ∗) (24)
for each θ. The following assumptions ensure that for every θ, h(x, θ) normalized by ‖θ − θ∗‖ is
also sub-exponential.
Assumption 3. There exist positive constants σ2 and α2 such that for any θ ∈ Θ with θ 6= θ∗ and
unit vector v ∈ B, 〈h(X, θ) − E [h(X, θ)] , v〉/‖θ − θ∗‖ is sub-exponential with scaling parameters
(σ2, α2), i.e., for all |λ| ≤ 1α2 ,
sup
θ∈Θ,v∈B
E
[
exp
(
λ〈h(X, θ) − E [h(X, θ)] , v〉
‖θ − θ∗‖
)]
≤ eσ22λ2/2.
The following lemma bounds the deviation of (1/n)
∑n
i=1 h(Xi, θ) from E [h(X, θ)] for every
θ ∈ Θ under Assumption 3. Its proof is similar to that of Lemma 6 and thus is omitted.
Lemma 7. Suppose Assumption 3 holds and fix any θ ∈ Θ. Let
∆′1(n, d, δ, σ2) =
√
2σ2
√
d log 6 + log(3/δ)
n
. (25)
If ∆′1(n, d, δ, σ2) ≤ σ22/α2, then
P
{∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
h(Xi, θ)− E [h(X, θ)]
∥∥∥∥∥ > 2∆′1(n, d, δ, σ2)‖θ − θ∗‖
}
≤ δ
3
.
Remark 5. Similar to ∆1(n, d, δ, σ2), if δ, σ1, and σ2 are fixed, and d = o(n), then for all sufficiently
large n, it holds that ∆′1(n, d, δ, σ2) ≤ σ22/α2.
We write ∆′1(n, d, δ, σ2) as ∆
′
1 or ∆
′
1(n) for short.
Assumption 2 and Assumption 3 can be potentially relaxed at an expense of looser concentration
bounds. Note that Assumption 3, roughly speaking, only imposes some smoothness condition w. r.
t. the optimal model θ∗. To mimic the Lipschitz continuity of the sample gradients (in stochastic
sense), we impose the following assumption, which holds automatically if we strengthen Assumption
3 by replacing θ∗ with an arbitrary θ′ such that θ 6= θ′. In general, Assumption 4 is strictly weaker
than the strengthened version of Assumption 3.
Assumption 4. For any δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists an M ′ =M ′(n, δ) that is non-increasing in n such
that
P
{
sup
θ,θ′∈Θ:θ 6=θ′
‖ 1n
∑n
i=1 (∇f(Xi, θ)−∇f(Xi, θ′)) ‖
‖θ − θ′‖ ≤M
′
}
≥ 1− δ
3
.
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With Assumption 2–Assumption 4, we apply the celebrated ǫ-net argument to prove the aver-
aged random gradients uniformly converges to ∇F (·).
For a given real number r > 0, define ∆2 as follows.
∆2(n) = σ2
√
2
n
√
d log
18M ∨M ′
σ2
+
1
2
d log
n
d
+ log
(
6σ22r
√
n
α2σ1δ
)
. (26)
Proposition 1. Suppose Assumption 2 – Assumption 4 hold, and Θ ⊂ {θ : ‖θ − θ∗‖ ≤ r√d} for
some positive parameter r. For any δ ∈ (0, 1) and any integer n, recall ∆1 defined in (22) and
define ∆2 as in (26). If ∆1 ≤ σ21/α1 and ∆2 ≤ σ22/α2, then
P
{
∀θ ∈ Θ :
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
∇f(Xi, θ)−∇F (θ)
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ 8∆2‖θ − θ∗‖+ 4∆1
}
≥ 1− δ.
Proof. The proof is based on the classical ǫ-net argument. Let
τ =
α2σ1
2σ22
√
d
n
and ℓ∗ = ⌈r
√
d/τ⌉.
Henceforth, for ease of exposition, we assume ℓ∗ is an integer. For integers 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ ℓ∗, define
Θℓ , {θ : ‖θ − θ∗‖ ≤ τℓ} .
For a given ℓ, let θ1, . . . , θNǫℓ be an ǫℓ-cover of Θℓ, where ǫℓ is given by
ǫℓ =
σ2τℓ
M ∨M ′
√
d
n
,
where M ∨M ′ = max{M,M ′}. By [Ver10, Lemma 5.2], logNǫℓ ≤ d log(3τℓ/ǫℓ). Fix any θ ∈
Θℓ. There exists a 1 ≤ jℓ ≤ Nǫℓ such that ‖θ − θjℓ‖2 ≤ ǫℓ. Recall that we let ∇f¯n(θ) denote
1
n
∑n
i=1∇f(Xi, θ). By triangle’s inequality,∥∥∇f¯n(θ)−∇F (θ)∥∥ ≤ ‖∇F (θ)−∇F (θjℓ)‖+ ∥∥∇f¯n(θ)−∇f¯n(θjℓ)∥∥+ ∥∥∇f¯n(θjℓ)−∇F (θjℓ)∥∥ .
(27)
In view of Assumption 1,
‖∇F (θ)−∇F (θjℓ)‖ ≤M‖θ − θjℓ‖ ≤Mǫℓ, (28)
where the last inequality holds because by the construction of ǫ-net, and the fact that for a given
θ, θjℓ is chosen in such a way that ‖θ − θjℓ‖ ≤ ǫℓ.
Define event
E1 =
{
sup
θ,θ′∈Θ:θ 6=θ′
‖∇f¯n(θ)−∇f¯n(θ′)‖
‖θ − θ′‖ ≤M
′
}
.
By Assumption 4, we have P {E1} ≥ 1− δ/3. On event E1, we have
sup
θ∈Θ
∥∥∇f¯n(θ)−∇f¯n(θjℓ)∥∥ ≤M ′ǫℓ. (29)
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By triangle’s inequality again,∥∥∇f¯n(θjℓ)−∇F (θjℓ)∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∇f¯n(θ∗)−∇F (θ∗)∥∥+ ∥∥∇f¯n(θjℓ)−∇f¯n(θ∗)− (∇F (θjℓ)−∇F (θ∗))∥∥
≤ ∥∥∇f¯n(θ∗)−∇F (θ∗)∥∥+
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
h(Xi, θjℓ)− E [h(X, θjℓ)]
∥∥∥∥∥ , (30)
where function h(x, ·) is defined in (23). Define event
E2 =
{∥∥∇f¯n(θ∗)−∇F (θ∗)∥∥ ≤ 2∆1}
and event
Fℓ =
{
sup
1≤j≤Nǫ
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
h(Xi, θj)− E [h(X, θj)]
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ 2τℓ∆2
}
,
where ∆2 is defined in (26) and satisfies
∆2 =
√
2σ2
√
d log 6 + d log(3τℓ/ǫℓ) + log(3ℓ∗/δ)
n
. (31)
In (26), note that ∆2 is independent of ℓ, due to the choice of ǫℓ made earlier. It is easy to check
that (26) and (31) are equivalent.
Since ∆1 ≤ σ21/α1, it follows from Lemma 6 that P {E2} ≥ 1− δ/3. Similarly, since ∆2 ≤ σ22/α2,
by Lemma 7, P {Fℓ} ≥ 1− δ/(3ℓ∗). In particular,
P {Fcℓ } = P
{
sup
1≤j≤Nǫℓ
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
h(Xi, θj)− E [h(X, θj)]
∥∥∥∥∥ > 2τℓ∆2
}
≤
Nǫℓ∑
j=1
P
{∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
h(Xi, θj)− E [h(X, θj)]
∥∥∥∥∥ > 2τℓ∆2
}
≤ δ
3ℓ∗
1(
3τℓ
ǫℓ
)d (3τℓǫℓ
)d
=
δ
3ℓ∗
. (32)
Therefore, we have P {Fℓ} ≥ 1− δ/(3ℓ∗).
In conclusion, by combining (27), (28), (29) and (30), it follows that on event E1 ∩ E2 ∩ Fℓ,
sup
θ∈Θℓ
∥∥∇f¯n(θ)−∇F (θ)∥∥ ≤ (M +M ′)ǫℓ + 2∆1 + 2∆2τℓ
≤ 4∆2τℓ+ 2∆1,
where the last inequality holds due to (M ∨M ′)ǫℓ ≤ ∆2τℓ. Let
E = E1 ∩ E2 ∩
(
∩ℓ∗ℓ=1Fℓ
)
.
It follows from the union bound, P {E} ≥ 1 − δ. Moreover, suppose event E holds. Then for all
θ ∈ Θℓ∗ , there exists an 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ ℓ∗ such that (ℓ− 1)τ < ‖θ − θ∗‖ ≤ ℓτ . If ℓ ≥ 2, then ℓ ≤ 2(ℓ − 1)
and thus ∥∥∇f¯n(θ)−∇F (θ)∥∥ ≤ 4∆2τℓ+ 2∆1 ≤ 8∆2‖θ − θ∗‖+ 2∆1.
If ℓ = 1, then ∥∥∇f¯n(θ)−∇F (θ)∥∥ ≤ 4∆2τ + 2∆1 ≤ 4∆1,
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where the last inequality follows from our choice of τ and the assumption that ∆2 ≤ σ22/α2 and
∆1 ≥ σ1
√
d/n. In conclusion, on event E ,
sup
θ∈Θℓ∗
∥∥∇f¯n(θ)−∇F (θ)∥∥ ≤ 4∆1 + 8∆2‖θ − θ∗‖.
The proposition follows by the assumption that Θ ⊂ Θℓ∗ .
Theorem 3. Suppose Assumption 2 – Assumption 4 hold, and Θ ⊂ {θ : ‖θ− θ∗‖ ≤ r√d} for some
positive parameter r. For any δ ∈ (0, 1) and any integer n, define ∆1(n) and ∆2(n) as in (22) and
(26), respectively. If ∆1(N/k) ≤ σ21/α1 and ∆2(N/k) ≤ σ22/α2, then for every 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k,
P {∀θ ∈ Θ : Cα‖Zℓ(θ)‖ ≤ ξ2‖θ − θ∗‖+ ξ1} ≥ 1− δ,
where ξ1 = 4Cα ×∆1(N/k) and ξ2 = 8Cα ×∆2(N/k).
Proof. Recall that Zℓ is defined in (10). Note that for each 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, Zℓ has the same distribution
as the average of N/k i.i.d. random gradients f(Xi, θ) subtracted by ∇F (θ). Hence, Theorem 3
readily follows from Proposition 1.
Remark 6. Suppose σ1, α1, σ2, α2 are all of Θ(1), log(M ∨M ′) = O(log d), log(1/δ) = O(d) and
log r = O(d log(N/k)). In this case, Theorem 3 implies that if N/k = Ω(C2αd log(N/k)), then
ξ1 = O
(
Cα
√
kd/N
)
and ξ2 = O
(
Cα
√
kd log(N/k)/N
)
.
In particular, those assumptions are indeed satisfied under the linear regression model as shown in
Lemma 8.
3.3 Main Theorem
By combining Theorem 2, Lemma 5, and Theorem 3, we prove the main theorem.
Theorem 4. Suppose Assumption 1 – Assumption 4 hold, and Θ ⊂ {θ : ‖θ− θ∗‖ ≤ r√d} for some
positive parameter r. Assume 2(1 + ǫ)q ≤ k ≤ m. Fix any constant α ∈ (q/k, 1/2) and any δ > 0
such that δ ≤ α− q/k. If ∆1(N/k) ≤ σ21/α1, ∆2(N/k) ≤ σ22/α2, and
ρ = 1−
√
1− L2/(4M2)− ξ2L/(2M2) > 0
for ξ2 = 8Cα ×∆2(N/k), then with probability at least
1− exp(−kD(α− q/k‖δ)),
the iterates {θt} given by Algorithm 2 with η = L/(2M2) satisfy
‖θt − θ∗‖ ≤ (1− ρ)t ‖θ0 − θ∗‖+ ηξ1/ρ, ∀t ≥ 1,
where ξ1 = 4Cα ×∆1(N/k).
Under certain conditions, we are able to further bound ξ1 and ξ2. Next we present a formal
statement of Theorem 1; it readily follows from Theorem 4.
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Theorem 5. Suppose that Assumption 1 – Assumption 4 hold such that L, M , σ1, α1, σ2, α2 are
all of Θ(1), and logM ′ = O (log d) . Assume that Θ ⊂ {θ : ‖θ − θ∗‖ ≤ r√d} for some positive
parameter r such that log(r) = O(d log(N/k)), and 2(1 + ǫ)q ≤ k ≤ m. Fix any α ∈ (q/k, 1/2) and
any δ > 0 such that δ ≤ α − q/k and log(1/δ) = O(d). There exist universal positive constants
c1, c2 such that if
N
k
≥ c1C2αd log(N/k),
then with probability at least
1− exp(−kD(α− q/k‖δ)),
the iterates {θt} given by Algorithm 2 with η = L/(2M2) satisfy
‖θt − θ∗‖ ≤
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
1− L
2
4M2
)t
‖θ0 − θ∗‖+ c2
√
dk
N
, ∀t ≥ 1.
Proof. Recall from (22) that
∆1(N/k, d, δ, σ1) =
√
2σ1
√
d log 6 + log(3/δ)
N/k
.
When σ1 = Θ(1) and log(1/δ) = O(d), it holds that ∆1(N/k) = Θ
(√
kd/N
)
. Similarly, we have
∆2(N/k) = Θ
(√
kd log(N/k)
N
)
. Hence, there exists an universal positive constant c1 such that for
all N/k ≥ c1C2αd log(N/k), it holds that ∆1(N/k) ≤ σ21/α1, ∆2(N/k) ≤ σ22/α2, and
∆2(N/k) ≤ M
2
8CαL
(
1−
√
1− L2/(4M2)
)
. (33)
Thus we have
ξ2 = 8Cα ×∆2(N/k) ≤ M
2
L
(
1−
√
1− L2/(4M2)
)
,
and as a consequence,
ρ = 1−
√
1− L2/(4M2)− ξ2L
2M2
≥ 1
2
− 1
2
√
1− L2/(4M2) > 0.
Hence, we can apply Theorem 4. Finally, to finish the proof, recall that η = L/(2M2) and ξ1 =
4Cα ×∆1(N/k); thus the term ηξ1/ρ can be bounded as follows:
ηξ1
ρ
=
L
2M2
× 4Cα∆1(N/k)
ρ
≤ L
2M2
× 8Cα∆1(N/k)
1−√1− L2/(4M2) ≤ c2
√
dk
N
,
where c2 is some universal constant.
4 Application to Linear Regression
We illustrate our general results by applying them to the classical linear regression problem.
Let Xi = (wi, yi) ∈ Rd × R denote the input data and define the risk function f(Xi, θ) =
1
2 (〈wi, θ〉 − yi)2 . For simplicity, we assume that yi is indeed generated from a linear model:
yi = 〈wi, θ∗〉+ ζi,
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where θ∗ is an unknown true model parameter, wi ∼ N(0, I) is the covariate vector whose covariance
matrix is assumed to be identity, and ζi ∼ N(0, 1) is i.i.d. additive Gaussian noise independent of
wi’s. Intuitively, the inner product 〈wi, θ∗〉 can be viewed as some “measurement” of θ∗ – the
signal; and ζi is the additive noise.
The population risk minimization problem (1) is simply
min
θ
1
2
‖θ − θ∗‖22 +
1
2
,
where
F (θ) , E [f(X, θ)] = E
[
1
2
(〈w, θ〉 − y)2
]
= E
[
1
2
(〈w, θ〉 − 〈w, θ∗〉 − ζ)2
]
=
1
2
‖θ − θ∗‖22 +
1
2
,
for which θ∗ is indeed the unique minimum. If the function F (·) can be computed exactly, then
θ∗ can be read from its expression directly. The standard gradient descent method for minimizing
F (·) is also straightforward. The population gradient is ∇θF (θ) = θ − θ∗. It is easy to see that
the population risk F is M -Lipschitz continuous with M = 1, and L-strongly convex with L = 1.
Hence, Assumption 1 is satisfied with M = L = 1; and the stepsize η = L/(2M2) = 1/2.
In practice, unfortunately, since we do not know exactly the distribution of the random input
X, we can neither read θ∗ from the expression F (·) nor compute the population gradient ∇F (θ)
exactly. We are only able to approximate the population risk F (·) or the population gradient
∇F (θ). Our focus is the gradient approximation. In particular, for a given random sample, the
associated random gradient is given by ∇f(X, θ) = w〈w, θ − θ∗〉 − wζ, where w ∼ N (0, I) and
ζ ∼ N (0, 1) that is independent of w.
The following lemma verifies that Assumption 2–Assumption 4 are satisfied with appropriate
parameters.
Lemma 8. Under the linear regression model, the sample gradient function ∇f(X, ·) satisfies
(1) Assumption 2 with σ1 =
√
2 and α1 =
√
2,
(2) Assumption 3 with σ2 =
√
8 and α2 = 8,
(3) and Assumption 4 with M ′(δ) = d+ 2
√
d log(4/δ) + 2 log(4/δ).
Proof. We first check Assumption 2. Recall that ∇f(X, θ) = w〈w, θ− θ∗〉−wζ, where w ∼ N (0, I)
and ζ ∼ N (0, 1) is independent of w. Hence, ∇f(X, θ∗) = −wζ. It follows that for any v in unit
sphere B,
〈∇f(X, θ∗), v〉 = −ζ 〈w, v〉 .
Because w ∼ N (0, I) and are independent of ζ, it holds that 〈w, v〉 ∼ N (0, 1) and is independent
of ζ. Thus, to compute E [exp (−λζ 〈w, v〉)], we can use the standard conditioning argument. In
particular, for λ2 < 1,
E [exp (λ 〈∇f(X, θ∗), v〉)] = E [exp (−λζ 〈w, v〉)]
= E [E [exp (−λy 〈w, v〉) |ζ = y]] , (34)
where the expectation of E [exp (−λy 〈w, v〉) |ζ = y] is taken over the conditional distribution of
〈w, v〉 conditioning on ζ being y. Since 〈w, v〉 and ζ are independent of each other, the conditional
distribution of 〈w, v〉 w. r. t. ζ is the same as the unconditional distribution of 〈w, v〉, which is a
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Gaussian distribution. Thus, we can apply the moment generating function of Gaussian distribution
to get
E [exp (−λy 〈w, v〉) |ζ = y] = exp (λ2y2/2) .
Then, the right-hand side of (34) becomes
E [exp (λ 〈∇f(X, θ∗), v〉)] = E [E [exp (−λy 〈w, v〉) |ζ = y]]
= E
[
exp
(
λ2ζ2/2
)]
(a)
= (1− λ2)−1/2, (35)
where equality (a) follows from the moment generating function of χ2 distribution, i.e.,
E
[
exp
(
tζ2
)]
= (1− 2t)−1/2 for t < 1/2.
Using the fact that 1− λ2 ≥ e−2λ2 for λ2 ≤ 1/2, it follows that
E [exp (λ 〈∇f(X, θ), v〉)] ≤ eλ2 , ∀|λ| ≤ 1√
2
.
Thus Assumption 2 holds with σ1 =
√
2 and α1 =
√
2.
Next, we verify Assumption 4. Note that ∇2f(X, θ) = ww⊤ and hence it suffices to show that
P
{∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
∇2f(Xi, θ)
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤M ′
}
= P
{∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
wiw
⊤
i
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤M ′
}
≥ 1− δ
3
,
for some M ′ depending on n, d, and δ.
Let W = [w1, w2, . . . , wn] denote the d × n matrix whose columns are given by wi’s. Then∑n
i=1wiw
⊤
i =WW
⊤. Also, the spectral norm of WW⊤ equals ‖W‖2. Therefore,
P
{∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
wiw
⊤
i
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤M ′
}
= P
{
‖W‖ ≤
√
nM ′
}
.
Note that W is an d × n matrix with i.i.d. standard Gaussian entries. Standard Gaussian matrix
concentration inequality (see, e.g., [Ver10, Corollary 5.35]) states that for every t ≥ 0,
P
{
‖W‖ ≤ √n+
√
d+ t
}
≥ 1− exp(−t2/2).
Plugging t =
√
2 log(4/δ) and setting
M ′ =
1
n
(√
n+
√
d+
√
2 log(4/δ)
)2
complete the proof.
Finally, we verify Assumption 3. Recall that the gradient difference h(X, θ) is given by h(X, θ) =
w〈w, θ − θ∗〉, and E [h(X, θ)] = θ − θ∗. It follows that for any vector v in unit sphere B,
〈h(X, θ)− E [h(X, θ)] , v〉 = 〈w, θ − θ∗〉〈w, v〉 − 〈θ − θ∗, v〉.
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For a fixed θ ∈ Θ with θ 6= θ∗ and let τ = ‖θ − θ∗‖ > 0. Then we have the following orthogonal
decomposition: θ − θ∗ = √γv +√ηv⊥, where γ + η = τ2, and v⊥ denote an vector perpendicular
to v. It follows that
〈w, θ − θ∗〉〈w, v〉 − 〈θ − θ∗, v〉 = √γ〈w, v〉2 −√γ +√η〈w, v⊥〉〈w, v〉.
It is easy to see that random variables 〈w, v⊥〉 ∼ N (0, 1) and 〈w, v〉 ∼ N (0, 1) are jointly Gaussian.
In addition, we have
E [〈w, v⊥〉〈w, v〉] = E
[
v⊤⊥ww
⊤v
]
= v⊤⊥E
[
ww⊤
]
v = v⊤⊥Iv = 0.
Thus, 〈w, v⊥〉 ∼ N (0, 1) and 〈w, v〉 ∼ N (0, 1) are mutually independent.
For any λ with λ
√
γ < 1/4 and λ2η < 1/4,
E [exp (λ〈h(X, θ)− E [h(X, θ)] , v〉)]
= E
[
exp
(
λ
√
γ
(〈w, v〉2 − 1)+ λ√η〈w, v⊥〉〈w, v〉)]
≤
√
E
[
e2λ
√
γ(〈w,v〉2−1)]
E
[
e2λ
√
η〈w,v⊥〉〈w,v〉]
= e−λ
√
γ
√
E
[
e2λ
√
γ(〈w,v〉2)]√
E
[
e2λ
√
η〈w,v⊥〉〈w,v〉]
= e−λ
√
γ (1− 4λ√γ)−1/4 (1− 4λ2η)−1/4 ,
where the first inequality holds due to Cauchy-Schwartz’s inequality, and the last equality follows by
plugging in the moment generating functions for χ2 distributions as well as using the conditioning
argument that is similar to the derivation of (34).
Using the fact that e−t/
√
1− 2t ≤ e2t2 for |t| ≤ 1/4 and 1− t ≥ e−4t for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1/2 , it follows
that for λ2 ≤ 1/(64τ2),
E [exp (λ〈h(X, θ) − E [h(X, θ)] , v〉)] ≤ exp (4λ2(γ + η))
≤ exp (4λ2τ2) .
Hence, Assumption 3 holds with σ2 =
√
8 and α2 = 8.
Thus, according to Theorem 1, our Byzantine Gradient Descent method can robustly solve the
linear regression problem exponentially fast with high probability – formally stated the following
corollary.
Corollary 1 (Linear regression). Under the aforementioned least-squares model for linear regres-
sion, assume Θ ⊂ {θ : ‖θ − θ∗‖ ≤ r√d} for r > 0 such that log r = O(d log(N/k)). Suppose
that 2(1 + ǫ)q ≤ k ≤ m. Fix any α ∈ (q/k, 1/2) and any δ > 0 such that δ ≤ α − q/k and
log(1/δ) = O(d), there exist universal constants c1, c2 > 0 such that if N/k ≥ c1C2αd log(N/k).
Then with probability at least 1 − exp(−kD((α− q/k) ‖δ)), the iterates {θt} given by Algorithm 2
with η = 1/2 satisfy
‖θt − θ∗‖ ≤
(
1
2
+
√
3
4
)t
‖θ0 − θ∗‖+ c2Cα
√
dk
N
, ∀t ≥ 1.
Note that in Corollary 1, we assume the “searching space” Θ belongs to some range, which may
grow with d and N/k. This assumption is rather mild since in practice; we typically do have some
prior knowledge about the range of θ∗.
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5 Related Work
The present paper intersects with two main areas of research: statistical machine learning and
distributed computing. Most related to our work is [BMGS17] that we became aware of when
preparing this paper. It also studies distributed optimization in adversarial settings, but the setup
is different from ours. In particular, their focus is solving an optimization problem, where all m
working machines have access to a common dataset {xi}Ni=1 and the goal is to collectively compute
the minimizer θ̂ of the average cost Q(θ) = (1/N)
∑N
i=1 f(xi, θ). Importantly, the dataset {xi}Ni=1
are assumed to be deterministic. In contrast, we adopt the standard statistical learning framework,
where each working machine only has access to its own data samples, which are assumed to be
generated from some unknown distribution µ, and the goal is to estimate the optimal model pa-
rameter θ∗ that minimizes the true prediction error EX∼µ[f(X, θ)] — as mentioned, characterizing
the statistical estimation accuracy is a main focus of ours. Our algorithmic approaches and main
results are also significantly different. The almost sure convergence is proved in [BMGS17] without
an explicit characterization of convergence speed nor the estimation errors.
Our work is also closely related to the literature on robust parameter estimation using geometric
median. It is shown in [LR91] that geometric median has a breakdown point of 0.5, that is, given
a collection of n vectors in Rd, at least ⌊(n + 1)/2⌋/n number of points needs to be corrupted in
order to arbitrarily perturb the geometric median. A more quantitative robustness result is recently
derived in [M+15, Lemma 2.1]. The geometric median has been applied to distributed machine
learning under the one-shot aggregation framework [FXM14], under the restrictive assumption that
the number of data available in each working machine satisfies N/m ≫ d. While we also apply
geometric median-of-mean as a sub-routine, our problem setup, overall algorithms and main results
are completely different.
A recent line of work [DKK+16, LRV16] presents polynomial algorithms to consistently estimate
the mean and covariance of a distribution from N i.i.d. samples in Rd, in the presence of an ǫ
fraction of malicious errors for sufficiently small ǫ, while geometric median is proved to fail when
ǫ = Ω(1/
√
d). However, it is unclear how to directly apply their results to our gradient descent
setting, where our goal is to robustly estimate a d-dimensional gradient function from i.i.d. sample
gradient functions.
On the technical front, a crucial step in our convergence proof is to show the geometric me-
dian of means of n i.i.d. random gradients converges to the underlying gradient function ∇F (θ)
uniformly over θ. Our proof builds on several ideas from the empirical process theory, which
guarantees uniform convergence of the empirical risk function (1/n)
∑n
i=1 f(Xi, ·) to the popula-
tion risk F (·). However, what we need is the uniform convergence of empirical gradient function
(1/n)
∑n
i=1∇f(Xi, ·), as well as its geometric median version, to the population gradient function
∇F (·). To this end, we use concentration inequalities to first establish point-wise convergence
and then boost it to uniform convergence via the celebrated ǫ-net argument. Similar ideas have
been used recently in the work [MBM16], which studies the stationary points of the empirical risk
function.
6 Discussion
In this paper, we consider the machine learning scenario where the model is trained in an unsecured
environment. As a result of this, the model training procedure needs to be robust to adversarial
interruptions. Based on the geometric median of means, we propose a communication-efficient
and robust method for the parameter server to aggregate the gradients reported by the unreliable
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workers. In each iteration, the parameter server first groups the received gradients into non-
overlapping batches to increase the “similarity” of the Byzantine-free batches; and then takes the
median of the batch gradients to cripple the interruption of Byzantine machines.
There are many other interesting directions. We list a few of them as follows.
• As mentioned in the introduction, Federated Learning is proposed due to the users’ concerns
about privacy breaches. In Federated Learning, the training data is kept locally on user’s
devices, which indeed grants users the control of their data. Nevertheless, to have a high-
quality model trained, information about their data need to be extracted. In our future work,
we would like to provide a precise characterization of the minimal amount of privacy has to
be sacrificed in the Federated Learning paradigm.
• In addition to security, low volume of local data and communication constraints, there are
many other practical challenges such as intermittent availability of mobile phones, i.e., com-
munication asynchrony. Although our algorithm only needs log(N) rounds, a single syn-
chronous round may be significantly “delayed” by the slow machines. We would like to adapt
our algorithms to the asynchronous setting.
• In Byzantine fault models, we assume the Byzantine adversaries know the realization of
the random bits generated by the parameter server. Depending on the applications, this
assumption can possibly be relaxed, which may lead to simpler algorithms. A simple idea
to defend against the relaxed Byzantine faults is to selects a subset of received gradients at
each iteration and then takes the average over the selected gradients. One selection rule is
random selection and another one is to select the gradients of the small ℓ2 norms. It would
be interesting to investigate the performance of these two selection rules and compare them
with the geometric median.
A Proof of Lemma 2.1
Proof. Let S = {i : ‖zi‖ ≤ r}. For any i ∈ S, we have
‖z∗ − zi‖ ≥ ‖z∗‖ − ‖zi‖ ≥ ‖z∗‖ − 2r + ‖zi‖.
Moreover, by triangle’s inequality, for all i /∈ S, we have
‖z∗ − zi‖ ≥ ‖zi‖ − ‖z∗‖
Combining the last two displayed equations yields that
n∑
i=1
‖z∗ − zi‖ ≥
n∑
i=1
‖zi‖+ (2|S| − n)‖z∗‖ − 2|S|r.
Since z∗ is a (1 + γ)-approximate solution of
∑n
i=1 ‖z − zi‖, it follows that
n∑
i=1
‖zi‖+ (2|S| − n)‖z∗‖ − 2|S|r ≤ (1 + γ)min
z
‖z − zi‖.
Note that
∑n
i=1 ‖zi‖ =
∑n
i=1 ‖0− zi‖ ≥ minz
∑n
i=1 ‖z − zi‖. Hence, it further implies that
(2|S| − n)‖z∗‖ − 2|S|r ≤ γmin
z
n∑
i=1
‖z − zi‖,
24
and thus
‖z∗‖ ≤ 2|S|r
2|S| − n +
γminz
∑n
i=1 ‖z − zi‖
2|S| − n ≤
2(1− α)r
1− 2α +
γminz
∑n
i=1 ‖z − zi‖
(1− 2α)n ,
where the last inequality holds due to |S| ≥ (1− α)n by the assumption.
B Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof. By (13) and the fact that ∇F (θ∗) = 0, we have
‖θ′ − θ∗‖2 = ‖θ − θ∗ − η∇F (θ)‖2
= ‖θ − θ∗ − η (∇F (θ)−∇F (θ∗))‖2
= ‖θ − θ∗‖2 + η2 ‖∇F (θ)−∇F (θ∗)‖2 − 2η 〈θ − θ∗,∇F (θ)−∇F (θ∗)〉 .
By Assumption 1, we have
‖∇F (θ)−∇F (θ∗)‖ ≤M‖θ − θ∗‖,
F (θ) ≥ F (θ∗) + 〈∇F (θ∗), θ − θ∗〉+ L
2
‖θ − θ∗‖2,
and
F (θ∗) ≥ F (θ) + 〈∇F (θ), θ∗ − θ〉 .
Summing up the last two displayed equations yields that
0 ≥ 〈∇F (θ)−∇F (θ∗), θ∗ − θ〉+ L
2
‖θ − θ∗‖2.
Therefore,
‖θ′ − θ∗‖2 ≤ (1 + η2M2 − ηL) ‖θ − θ∗‖2 .
The conclusion follows by the choosing η = L/2M2.
C Concentration Inequality for Sub-exponential Random Vari-
ables
Definition 1 (Sub-exponential). Random variable X with mean µ is sub-exponential if ∃ ν > 0
and α > 0 such that
E [exp (λ(X − µ))] ≤ exp
(
ν2λ2
2
)
, ∀|λ| ≤ 1
α
.
Theorem 6. If X1, . . . ,Xn are independent random variables where Xi’s are sub-exponential with
scaling parameters (νi, αi) and mean µi, then
∑n
i=1Xi is sub-exponential with scaling parameters
(ν∗, α∗), where ν2∗ =
∑n
i=1 ν
2
i and α∗ = max1≤i≤nαi. Moreover,
P
{
n∑
i=1
(Xi − µi) ≥ t
}
≤
{
exp
(−t2/(2ν2∗ )) if 0 ≤ t ≤ ν2∗/α∗
exp (−t/(2α∗)) o.w.
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